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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become one of the enabling
technologies in many safety-critical applications, e.g., autonomous
driving and medical image analysis. DNN systems, however, suffer
from various kinds of threats, such as adversarial example attacks
and fault injection attacks. While there are many defense meth-
ods proposed against maliciously crafted inputs, solutions against
faults presented in the DNN system itself (e.g., parameters and
calculations) are far less explored. In this paper, we develop a novel
lightweight fault-tolerant solution for DNN-based systems, namely
DeepDyve, which employs pre-trained neural networks that are
far simpler and smaller than the original DNN for dynamic ver-
ification. The key to enabling such lightweight checking is that
the smaller neural network only needs to produce approximate
results for the initial task without sacrificing fault coverage much.
We develop efficient and effective architecture and task exploration
techniques to achieve optimized risk/overhead trade-off in Deep-
Dyve. Experimental results show that DeepDyve can reduce 90%
of the risks at around 10% overhead.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning with deep neural networks (DNNs) can produce
results that have surpassed human-level performance in many chal-
lenging tasks lately, and it keeps improving. Consequently, DNNs
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have become one of the foundation techniques in artificial intelli-
gence (AI) applications. Lots of them (e.g., autonomous driving and
medical image analysis) are safety- and security-sensitive.
Many researchers in the machine learning community believe
that DNNs are rather robust to faults [10, 22], wherein removing
some neurons or parameters leads to a graceful degradation in
model accuracy. However, practical faults do not manifest them-
selves as the elimination of individual weights or neurons. Instead,
they lead to bit-flips on DNN parameters or activations. Li et al. [23]
conducted a case study on the Eyeriss DNN accelerator [4] under
transient faults. Their results show that the FIT rate caused by
random soft errors is far beyond the one required by the ISO 26262
standard (10 FIT1) [14] for the functional safety of road vehicles.
Comparing to random errors, transient faults caused by malicious
attacks are more severe. A recent attack named DeepHammer [44]
shows that it can successfully tamper DNN inference behavior in
practical setup, wherein the accuracy of multiple DNN classifica-
tion systems are reduced to be as low as random guess within a
few minutes, by leveraging the rowhammer vulnerability of DRAM
used in the system.
There are a few recent research towards fault-tolerant DNN sys-
tem designs. In [23], Li et al. proposed to set up a simple threshold
to detect those faults that lead to drastic changes in DNN parame-
ters. Such symptom-based error detectors have very little hardware
overhead, but their detection capabilities are quite limited, espe-
cially for those quantized DNNs used in safety-critical embedded
systems. They are also not applicable to defend against malicious
faults [33, 44, 45]. To tackle this problem, a replication-based error
detection technique for DNN systems was proposed in [24], but its
overhead is quite high, requiring 40% extra computation to reach
60% fault coverage on CIFAR-10 dataset.
This paper aims for a solution with sufficient fault coverage
yet little overhead for DNN-based classification systems. The term
dynamic verification was introduced in [1], which detects errors
in a complex super-scalar core by checking it with a core that is
architecturally identical but micro-architecturally far simpler and
smaller. Unlike symptom-based error detection techniques that
check for abnormal behaviors, dynamic verification techniques
check for in-variants in the system that are nearly always true over
all possible executions. Following this idea, the proposed solution,
namely DeepDyve, deploys a small neural network (referred to as
the checker DNN ) to approximate the original complex DNN model
(referred to as the task DNN ), and checks whether they produce
consistent outputs in an end-to-end manner. If their results do not
match, re-computation on the task DNN is performed for potential
fault recovery, if any.
1Failure-in-Time Rate: 1 FIT = 1 failure per 1 billion hours.
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Unlike [1], the result produced by the small checker DNN for
error detection is only an approximate result. Hence, there will be
both false positives (i.e., flagging nonexistent failures) and false neg-
atives (i.e., miss to report failures) with DeepDyve. False positives
result in unnecessary re-computation cost, while false negatives
lead to fault coverage loss. Consequently, it is essential to achieve
high consistency between the task DNN and the checker DNN un-
der the fault-free situation. We formulate the checker DNN design
problem as a design exploration problem, wherein we evaluate a set
of candidate small DNN designs for the given big task DNN model
and choose the one with optimized coverage/overhead trade-off as
the checker DNN.
On the one hand, we obtain the set of candidate checker DNNs
by compressing and transferring the task DNN model’s knowledge
through knowledge distillation [11]. On the other hand, the given
classiïňĄcation task might be too complicated for the much smaller
checker DNNs. Under such circumstances, we allow the checker
DNN to perform the classiïňĄcation task with reduced complexity.
For example, given a task to classify ten objects wherein two kinds
of objects are easily confused, we could allow the checker DNN to
perform a simpler problem with these two objects treated as one
class. By doing so, there will be much less false positives in dynamic
veriïňĄcation, at the cost of more false negatives since we would
not be able to identify those faults that result in misclassification
between these two kinds of objects. Consequently, we need to
carefully perform task simpliïňĄcation for the checker DNN design
to strike an optimized balance between coverage and overhead.
From the safety and security perspective, misclassifying different
classes often has quite different impacts. For example, in a traffic
sign recognition system,misclassifying a "Yield" sign as a "Stop" sign
does not cause much trouble, but the opposite misclassification may
cause severe traffic accidents. We need to consider such risk impacts
in the checker DNN design. That is, we should be more concerned
about the risk/overhead trade-off instead of coverage/overhead
trade-off.
The proposed DeepDyve solution considers the above issues,
and the main contributions of this paper include:
• To the best of our knowledge, DeepDyve is the first dynamic
verification technique for resilient DNN designs, which uses
a far simpler and smaller checker DNN for online error de-
tection and recovery.
• We propose a novel two-stage checker DNN design method-
ology, which explores both the checker DNN architectures
and task simplification possibilities. In particular, we propose
a novel checker DNN architecture exploration technique
with theoretical guarantees. Also, being able to manipulate
the tasks performed on the checker DNN dramatically in-
creases the solution space of DeepDyve.
• DeepDyve leverages the uneven risk probabilities and safety
impact among classes to guide the design exploration proce-
dure. Experimental results on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, CIFAR-100,
and Tiny-ImageNet datasets show that it can reduce up to
90% of the risks at around 10% computational overhead.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2
presents the preliminaries and motivation of this work. Then, we
give an overview of DeepDyve in Section 3. Next, we detail the
checker DNN architecture exploration and task exploration tech-
niques in Section 4 and 5, respectively. Experimental results are
presented in Section 6. Then, we discuss the applications and limi-
tations of DeepDyve in Section 7, followed by the survey of related
works in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes this paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we first present the impact of hardware faults (ran-
dom or malicious) on the reliability and security of DNN systems
in Section 2.1. Then, we provide the threat model in Section 2.2.
At last, we illustrate the motivation for the proposed DeepDyve
solution in Section 2.3.
2.1 DNN Systems under Faults
There are mainly two types of attacks during the inference of DNN
systems: adversarial example attack and fault injection attack. Ad-
versarial example attacks [9, 28] try to fool DNN systems by crafting
subtle malicious perturbations on inputs, and there is a vast body
of research on this topic [20, 27, 31, 32]. By contrast, fault injection
attack aims to break the system by injecting faults into the inter-
nal system execution pipeline, e.g., flipping data bits in processing
elements. This problem is less explored in the literature, and the
overhead of existing defense techniques is quite high.
Various types of transient faults can be introduced into DNN sys-
tems by attackers, e.g., clock glitch attack [30], voltage glitch attack
[36], and rowhammer attack [17]. Besides malicious faults, tran-
sients faults could also occur due to environmental perturbations
such as alpha particle strikes.
The Impact of Transient Faults. Transient faults may occur at
the data paths and buffers of processing units [23] or inside the
memories of DNN-based systems [12]. Such faults would man-
ifest themselves as errors in DNN calculations or intermediate
values [34] during inference. A failure occurs when errors prop-
agate to the outputs of the system and cause behavioral changes,
which could lead to catastrophic consequences in safety-critical
applications, e.g., misclassifying a "Stop" sign as a "Yield" sign in au-
tonomous vehicles and taking the wrong action. In the following, if
not specified, faults, errors and failures are used in an exchangeable
manner, and we are only concerned with those faults that cause
misclassifications.
Existing Attacks. Recently, DNNs are shown to be vulnerable
to fault injection attacks [26]. In [12], the authors estimated that
40–50% of the parameters in a DNN model could lead to an ac-
curacy drop greater than 10% when bit-flips occur in their data
representation. While it was shown that quantized DNNs are more
resilient to fault injection attacks, the recent progressive BitFlip
Attack (BFA) [33] proposed by Rakin et. al. can reduce the accuracy
of a quantized ResNet-18 from 68.9% to 0.1% with only 13 bit-flips.
BFA combines gradient ranking and progressive search to identify
those vulnerable bits that degrade model accuracy significantly
when flipped. The follow-up work DeepHammer by Yao el al. [44]
proves the effectiveness of BFAs in practice, by row-hammering
against various real DNN systems.
Existing Defenses. For DNNs implemented on floating-point
machines, only a small fraction of the dynamic range provided by
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
avtivation values
0
20
40
60
80
100
fre
qu
en
cy
benign
failure
Figure 1: Comparison of the maximum activation value be-
tween benign and failure cases (because of fault attack) from
a quantized (8-bit integer) classifier.
the data type is used. If a fault makes the magnitude of intermediate
output values huge, it is likely to lead to a failure. Based on this ob-
servation, Li et al. proposed to use a simple threshold to detect those
faults that lead to intermediate outputs beyond it [23]. To be specific,
before deployment, they record the value ranges (Xmin ,Xmax ) of
the output for each layer. After deployment, the output value range
is then checked in the run-time. They consider a fault is detected if
there are output values beyond the range (1.1×Xmin , 1.1×Xmax ).
This anomaly detector has very little hardware overhead, but its
detection capabilities are quite limited, especially for recent attacks
on quantized DNN systems. We show an example in Figure 1 where
the threshold-based anomaly detector fails to detect faults in quan-
tized classifiers. For the threshold detector to detect faults, at least
the maximum activation value should be beyond the normal range.
However, our experiment shows that the maximum activation val-
ues from all failure cases (due to hardware fault) are not bigger than
the normal boundary.
Li et al. [24] design a replication-based error detection technique
for deep neural networks. However, their overhead is quite high.
They spend 40% overhead to reach 60% fault coverage on CIFAR-10.
In the DeepHammer work [44], the authors discuss a few potential
mitigation techniques but do not provide any quantitative results
for their effectiveness.
2.2 Threat Model
In this work, we consider the attacker is trying to compromise the
accuracy of a DNN system by maliciously injecting faults into it.
Unlike crafting malicious inputs to fool DNN systems, we target
faults presented in the system internals, i.e., processing elements,
buffered weights, and intermediate values stored in on-chip buffers
or memories, and so on. We consider the attacker succeeds if the
model’s output class is different from the one obtained in an attack-
free environment.
We assume the attackers have full knowledge of the DNN and
its deployment on the device, including neural network topology,
parameters, and low-level implementation details, e.g., the position
of intermediate values stored in memories. Weak attackers could
Table 1: A Motivational example.
Checker DNN Size Accuracy Computational Overhead
A 1% 80% ∼21%
B 5% 92% ∼13%
C 10% 94% ∼16%
launch random bit-flips, while for strong attackers, they can pre-
cisely locate and launch fault injection in the processing pipeline.
Moreover, we assume the same transient faults would not occur
in consecutive DNN inference runs. Firstly, reliability threats rarely
occur and the probability to occur repeatedly in a short period is
negligible. Secondly, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to launch
the same faults repeatedly in a DNN system. For example, in [44],
launching a rowhammer attack requires long preparation time
(several minutes). As long as the DNN inference time is short (and
usually it is), attackers do not have sufficient time to launch the
same attack in the second run.
2.3 Motivation
For any classification problem, there could be many DNN models
with different size/accuracy trade-offs to solve it. Although big
models often have higher accuracy, many inputs can be correctly
handled by small models. Therefore, we could employ a smaller
checker DNN to perform the same task, and they should output the
same results inmost cases when faults do not occur. In this way, the
task model can be dynamically verified for online error detection
and recovery. Note that, it is not possible to achieve deterministic
dynamic verification for such systems because the outputs of a
simple model cannot achieve 100% consistency with that of the
original model.
As discussed earlier, because the checker DNN is less accurate,
there will be false positives and false negatives. Generally speaking,
the larger the checker DNN is, the more accurate it is [40], but it
does not necessarily lead to larger computational overhead. We
use the following example to illustrate the impact of checker DNN
design.
Suppose the task DNN model is with ∼100% accuracy, and there
are three candidate checker DNNmodels: A, B, and C. Their relative
sizes compared to the task DNN and their classification accuracy
are shown in the second and the third column of Table 1. Consider
transient fault-induced failures are rare events, the computational
overhead of the three models is estimated in the fourth column,
which is the sum of the computational cost of the checker DNN
itself (as it is always on) and the re-computation cost on the task
DNN when the checker DNN produces a different classification
result (false positive cases).
If the misclassifications caused by faults are evenly distributed
among all classes, the fault coverage would be similar to the ac-
curacy of the checker DNN. For this particular example, checker
B can achieve ∼92% fault coverage with 5% hardware cost and
∼13% computational cost, which significantly outperforms existing
fault-tolerant solutions for DNN designs. This has motivated the
proposed DeepDyve solution in this paper.
In practice, fault-inducedmisclassifications are usually not evenly
distributed. Moreover, misclassifying different classes often have
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Figure 2: DeepDyve architecture and the design flow.
different risk implications for safety-critical systems. Therefore, for
any possible checker DNN, we need to consider the risk impact
and apply fault simulation to evaluate its effectiveness. This is a
time-consuming process. Therefore, the critical challenge is how to
efficiently explore the solution space of all possible checker DNN
designs to find the one with an optimized risk/overhead trade-off.
3 DEEPDYVE OVERVIEW
Figure 2 (a) depicts the proposed DeepDyve architecture. It con-
tains three parts: the original network, the checker DNN, and the
comparator. The checker DNN is a smaller and simpler DNN model
which approximates the original network and the original task.
An input instance is processed by both of the two models. Their
outputs are checked by the comparator and accepted if consistent.
Otherwise, the input instance is subject to a re-computation by the
original model, and the new prediction is accepted, regardless of
whether the two model outputs are consistent or not.
Design Goals.We first formally define the evaluation metrics (e.g.
coverage and overhead). We evaluate the cost of checker DNN
design by the introduced overhead. The overhead of the checker
DNNs can be calculated as follows:
O (S ) = paramssmall
paramsbiд
, (1)
O (C) = FLOP (netsmall ) + (1 − Pconsistent ) × FLOP (netbiд )
FLOP (netbiд )
, (2)
O(S) andO(C) stand for the storage overhead and computational
overhead, respectively, wherein params stands for the storage re-
quirement of model parameters with unit of Mega Bytes (MB), and
FLOP function calculates the number of multiply-accumulation
operations in the network. The computational overhead contains
two parts: FLOP of the small network (static overhead) and the
re-computation overhead (dynamic overhead) when the small net-
work output is different from that of the big one (with probability
1 − Pconsistent ).
The detection ability of DeepDyve is characterized by the cover-
age rate. A popular definition of fault coverage would be number of
classification failures detected among all mis-classifications caused
by faults, as show in in Equation 3. DFi, j stands for the detected
failures mis-classified from class i to class j, and TFi, j denotes the
total failures from class i to class j when faults occur. To take the
different risk impact of different failures on safety-critical applica-
tion into consideration, we introduce a new metric called weighted
coverage, abbreviated asWCov . in Equation 4. Ii, j is the risk impact
if class i is mis-classified into class j, which will be defined later
in this Section. Note that Cov . is a special case ofWCov . when all
misclassifications have the same risk impact. In later text, we use
coverage and weighted coverage interchangeably and they both
refer to weighted coverage if not specified.
Cov . =
∑
i j DFi j∑
i j T Fi j
. (3)
WCov . =
∑
i j DFi j × Ii j∑
i j T Fi j × Ii j
, ∀i, j ∈ N and i , j . (4)
Design Stages. Under the guidance of the design goals, there are
mainly two stages in designing of the checker DNN and we show
them in Figure 2 (b). The first stage is architecture exploration,
where we initialize the architecture of the checker DNN. Given a
task model, a pool of checker DNN candidates with the same task of
the given model are generated with model compression techniques.
Then, one of them is picked from the pool by evaluating their over-
head and fault coverage, detailed in Section 4. The second stage is
task exploration, where we try to manipulate the classification tasks
performed by the checker DNN to achieve better coverage/overhead
trade-off. That is, we can find a better solution by providing more
design options at the task level, detailed in Section 5.
To solve the above design exploration problems, we define the
following three matrices:
• Risk impact matrix I ∈ RN×N. In safety-critical DNN appli-
cations, the risk impact of different misclassifications may
vary significantly from the system perspective. Each entry
in I denotes the cost of the corresponding misclassification
(the larger the value, the higher the cost). As the actual risk
impact depends on the application, the values in the impact
matrix should be carefully determined by system designers.
• Risk probability matrix R ∈ RN×N, where the entry Ri j de-
notes the probability that the i-th class is misclassified to
j-th class when faults occur, and N denotes the total number
of classes. Risk probability matrix is obtained from fault in-
jection experiments. Figure 3 shows an example of R drawn
from CIFAR-10 dataset by performing random fault injection
on VGG-16 for 400,000 times. From this example, we can
Predicted Label
0.00 0.04 0.48 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.31 0.13
0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.43
0.76 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.05 0.01
0.19 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.32 1.00 0.62 0.53 0.21 0.10
0.02 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.00
0.38 0.00 0.09 0.85 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.48 0.02 0.00
0.03 0.00 0.34 0.24 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.16 0.00 0.14 0.39 0.48 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.75 0.23 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.31
0.10 0.60 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00
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Figure 3: An example of risk probability matrix obtained
from CIFAR-10 (normalized for visualization).
observe fault-induced misclassifications are far from evenly
distributed.
• Inconsistency matrix C ∈ RN×N, wherein each entry Ci j
denotes the probability that one sample is labeled as i-th
class by the task model while is labeled as j-th class by the
small model in DeepDyve. Note that entry Cii , i ∈ [1..N ]
equals to zero. In practice, some classes are naturally more
difficult to classify (e.g., dog and cat in the CIFAR-10 dataset)
than others. These difficult classes cause more inconsistency
than the easy ones. Combining them as one class (e.g., as
pet) in the checker DNN is relatively easy to achieve high
consistency.
Risk impact matrix I will be used in calculating weighted cover-
age. Besides, the three matrices I, R and C will be all used in task
exploration, wherein we try to combine those classes that are easily
confused yet have less risk for task simplification.
4 ARCHITECTURE EXPLORATION
The objective of the architecture exploration procedure is to find a
initial checker DNN model that achieves good fault coverage with
low overhead defined in Section 3. To this end, firstly, we generate
a pool of checker DNN candidates. The generation process is try-
ing to minimize the overhead with the help of model compression
techniques proposed in [13], detailed in Section 4.1. Second, as dif-
ferent candidates offer different trade-offs between overheads and
coverage, we illustrate how to efficiently search for an appropriate
checker DNN design from the candidates in Section 4.2.
4.1 Checker DNN Candidate Generation
In DeepDyve, the consistency between predictions of the checker
DNN and those of the original DNN decides the computational
overhead O(C). Consider an input that is mis-classified by the orig-
inal DNN when no faults occur, we would like to have the checker
DNN output the same wrong label, so that DeepDyve does not flag
a nonexistent failure, avoiding unnecessary re-computation.
To improve consistency, given the taskDNNmodel, we usemodel
compression to generate the checker model candidates. Specifically,
Table 2: ResNet-10 with different width multiplier.
α Accuracy(%) O(S) (MB) O(C) (GFLOPs)
1.0 97.54 1.23 0.06
0.7 96.94 0.60 0.03
0.5 96.20 0.31 0.02
0.3 95.75 0.12 0.01
we use two types of model compression techniques. First, we use
architecture compression to search for the potential architectures
and then we use knowledge distillation to train our checker DNN.
Architecture Compression. No doubt to say, the amount of
available design choices has a significant impact on any design
exploration problem. In order to increase the design options for
DeepDyve, we adopt the model compression approach in [13] to
make the size of checker DNNs adjustable. To be specific, given
the task DNN architecture, we use a single width multiplier α to
adjust it, by uniformly scaling down the number of channels (or
neurons if it is a linear layer) for each layer. For example, a feature
map with 100 channels will be scaled down to the one with ten
channels with α being set to 0.1. By applying width multiplier, the
resulting model architecture has much less overhead.
We take one of popular architectures—ResNet trained on GT-
STB [39] as a case study to show the effect of width multiplier.
Table 2 lists the accuracy, the storage overhead (in MegaByte) and
the computational overhead (in Giga Floating Point Operations) of
ResNet-10 with different width multipliers. The first row stands
for the original ResNet-10. As can be observed, accuracy drops
smoothly with smaller model size and less computational cost.
Parameter Training. To further improve the consistency be-
tween the task DNN and the checker DNN, we use knowledge distil-
lation to train the checker DNN. Knowledge distillation, formulated
by Hinton et al. [11], is a training solution to distill a task model
(teacher model) and transfer knowledge to a simpler model (student
model).
In our training, the first step of knowledge distillation from the
task DNN is to covert the pre-softmax logits, zi , computed for each
class into a probability, pi , by Equation 5 with the temperature T .
pi =
exp(zi /T )∑
j exp(zj /T )
(5)
With higher temperature, the new targets for the checker DNN to
learn are ‘softer’ probability distributions over classes.
Next, the checker DNN is trained by minimizing the knowledge
distillation loss (LKD ), which is defined as:
LKD = λT
2 ×CrossEntropy(PTC , PTO )
+ (1 − λ) ×CrossEntropy(PC ,ytrue ), (6)
wherein PTC and P
T
O are the softened outputs of the checker DNN
and the original DNN under the same temperature T . The first
component of LKD forces the checker DNN towards approximating
similar output distribution of the original DNN (i.e., consistency),
whereas the second component of LKD forces the checker DNN
towards correctly classifying inputs as usual (i.e., accuracy). We use
λ to tune the weighted average between the kinds of losses.
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Figure 4: An illustrative example of agglomerative class clustering.
4.2 Search Strategy
Our search strategy is based on the empirical observation that the
consistency between the two models in DeepDyve is related to the
multiplier α used to generate the small checker DNN (α << 1).
Here we formally define the consistency function of α by:
Definition 1. Letдt (x) andдα (x) be the task DNNmodel and the
checker DNN model generated from the task DNN with a multiplier
α . Each model д takes a vector of input x and outputs a class of
y ∈ (0..N − 1), where N is the number of classes. We define the
consistency function as the probability that the outputs are consistent
over the input space X.
f (α) = P(дt (x) = дα (x)), x ∈ X (7)
We choose a simple function with the form of f (α) = − aα + b to
approximate the consistency function. In this function, a and b are
positive parameters whose values can be obtained via curve fitting
after collecting a number of checker DNN models with different
α and the corresponding consistency values. Besides, because 0 ≤
f (α) ≤ 1 and 0 < α ≤ 1, we can obtain the valid range of α , which
is ab ≤ α ≤ 1.
Once a and b are known, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose f (α) is approximated with − aα + b, when
a > 0, b > 0, and ab ≤ α ≤ 1. We can find an optimal α = 3
√
a
2 where
the computational overhead O(C) is minimized.
Proof. First, for a neural network composed of linear and con-
volutional layers, the FLOPs of the checker DNN with a multiplier
α is α2 times the original FLOPs. Recall that the number of floating
point operations (FLOPs) for one linear layer can be estimated by:
2 × I ×O (8)
where I andO are number of input and output neurons in one linear
layer, respectively. Therefore, the FLOP of a compressed linear layer
with multiplier α is:
α2 × (2 × I ×O) (9)
Similarly, for a convolutional layer, the floating point operations
with multiplier α is estimated by:
(2 × k2 ×Cin ) × (Hout ×Wout ×Cout ) (10)
where k stands for the kernel size, andCin ,Cout stands for number
of input and output channels, respectively. Hout andWout are the
height and the width of the output tensors. Given this, the FLOP of
a compressed convolutional layer with multiplier α is:
α2 × (2 × k2 ×Cin ) × (Hout ×Wout ×Cout ). (11)
Hence, if we add all layers together, the final FLOPs of the checker
DNN will be α2 times of the task model where α = 1.
Providing this, the computational overhead of DeepDyve with
the checker DNN can be simplified from Equation 2 to Equation 12.
O(C) = α2 + (1 − f (α)),α ∈ (0, 1] (12)
O(C) = α2 + (1 + a
α
− b),α ∈ (0, 1],a > 0,b > 0, (13)
∇O(C) = 2α − a
α2
,α ∈ (0, 1],a > 0 (14)
Let ∇O(C) = 0, then α = 3
√
a
2 (15)
To find the optimal point, we calculate the gradient of O(C) as
Equation 14. By letting the gradient equals to 0, we obtain the
optimal point of α , which is 3
√
a
2 , as shown in Equation 15. □
Therefore, to obtain the optimal α , we are going to fit the con-
sistency function − aα + b with the given candidate pool. After that,
we select the checker DNN with α = 3
√
a
2 .
5 TASK EXPLORATION
After the initial checker architecture is fixed, DeepDyve performs
task exploration to achieve better risk/overhead trade-off. In Sec-
tion 5.1, we first discuss how to perform task simplification effi-
ciently under the guidance of risk probability matrix R, risk impact
matrix I and inconsistency matrix C. The first step generates a
bunch of different tasks. Then, we detail the search strategy to
select the best task in Section 5.2.
Algorithm 1: Agglomerative class clustering
Input: Risk matrix R, inconsistency matrix C, No. of classes
N , class labels L
Output: (N − 2) cluster label lists
/* Initialize */
1 k = N − 1;
2 candidateList = [];
3 for q = 1, 2, . . . ,N do
4 Gq = lq ; // Cluster with single class
5 λq = q; // Initialize cluster label
6 end
7 while k ≥ 2 do
/* Select clusters based on two criteria */
8 indexList = all argmini, j COVloss (i, j) in R;
9 (n,m) = argmaxi, j Osave (i, j) in indexList ;
/* Update cluster label list, matrices */
10 Merge Gn and Gm , Update clusters {G} and λ;
11 Update R, C;
/* Add cluster label list to candidates */
12 candidateList[k] = λ;
13 k = k − 1;
14 end
15 return candidateList ;
5.1 Agglomerative Class Clustering
Given the original N -class task, our problem is to find a simpli-
fied K-class task for any given checker DNN with better over-
head/coverage trade-off. We consider it as a clustering problem
and propose the Agglomerative Class Clustering to solve it (see
Algorithm 1).
Formally, we assume the labels of original N classes as: L =
{l1, l2, . . . , lN }. For the sake of simplicity, we canmap the labels into
integer numbers, as L = {1, 2, . . . ,N }. They are to be grouped into
K clusters {Gk |k = 1, 2, . . . ,K}, where Gk ′
⋂
k ′,k Gk =  and L =⋃K
k=1Gk . Accordingly, we can use λi ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} to represent
the cluster label of original label li . Then, the clustering result can
be represented by a cluster label list: λ = (λ1, λ2, · · · , λN ).
Risk matrix R. The risk probability matrix and risk impact matrix
can be integrated into one single risk matrix with an element-wise
multiplication:
R = R ⊙ I, (16)
wherein each entry in R stands for the risk between classes of the
big network.
Two clustering criteria. Merging two classes into one cluster
have two effects:
• Coverage loss, since fault-induced misclassfications between
the two classes cannot be detected any more. Hence, we
prefer merging classes with small values in risk matrix R.
• Overhead savings, because the simplified task is easy to learn
and it will be more consistent with the big DNN, thereby
reducing re-computational overhead.
We use COVloss and Osave to denote such effects, which are
used in Algorithm 1.
Updating R andC.After selecting two classes or clusters to merge,
we should update the R and C accordingly. Assuming cluster Gi
and G j (i < j) are to be merged, we first move classes in cluster
G j to Gi , as Gi = Gi
⋃
G j , delete G j and re-assign the cluster label
for the rest of clusters. Then we update the risk and inconsistency
values of Gi (i-th row and i-th column of R and C) as the sum of
the corresponding values of two clusters. Lastly, we delete the j-th
row and j-th column in R and C. In this way, we aggregate the risk
probability and inconsistency values of two merged clusters while
preserving the property of the matrices defined in Section 3.
Clustering scheme.Weapply a hierarchical clustering algorithm—
agglomerative class clustering, which is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Specifically, each class of the original task starts in its own cluster.
Then, we search for two clusters with the smallest coverage loss in
R. Note that R (see Figure 3) is usually sparse, in case of multiple
occurrences of the minimum value, we choose the one with the
largest overhead savings from C, which in turn improves the model
consistency between the task model and the checker DNN. Next, we
merge the two selected clusters into one cluster and update R and C.
The above procedure iterates in a bottom-upmanner until all classes
of the original task are merged as a single cluster. Consequently,
the clustering results can be presented in a dendrogram with K = 2
to K = N − 1 clustering candidates, which enables later exploration
for the optimal simplified task for a given checker DNN. Figure 4
shows an example of the iterative clustering procedure with five
classes and the generated dendrogram.
5.2 Search Strategy
After obtaining candidate tasks from Algorithm 1, we evaluate the
corresponding overhead savings and coverage loss with fault injec-
tion experiments. As the number of candidate tasks N − 1 increases
linearly with the number of original classes, we can evaluate them
efficiently. Afterwards, we have a list of pareto-optimal checker
DNN designs with various coverage/overhead trade-offs. We then
choose the optimal final DNN design.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of DeepDyve. First,
we present our experimental setup in Section 6.1. After that, our
results that architecture exploration facilitates to find an optimized
checker DNN architecture in Section 6.2, and task simplification
further saves the overhead of DeepDyve in Section 6.3, respectively.
We show DeepDyve outperforms existing solutions in Section 6.4.
At last, in Section 6.5, we discuss the impact of model accuracy
through a case study on CIFAR-100.
6.1 Setup
Datasets.We demonstrate the effectiveness of DeepDyve on four
widely used image classification datasets: CIFAR-10 [19], The Ger-
man Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [39], CIFAR-
100 [19], and Tiny-ImageNet [21]. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets
contain 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images, and they
have 10 and 100 classes, respectively. GTSRB has 43 classes of dif-
ferent traffic signs. It has 39,209 training images and 12,630 test
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Figure 5: Risk probability matrices of different models under four million fault injections.
Table 3: Datasets and Task Models.
Dataset #Classes Task Model Accuracy FLOPs Parameter
CIFAR-10 10 ResNet-152 96.15% 3.75 G 58.22 M
GTSRB 43 ResNet-34 99.40% 1.16 G 21.30 M
CIFAR-100 100 ResNet-152 80.11% 3.75 G 58.22 M
Tiny-ImageNet 200 WideResNet-101 85.20% 22.84 G 126.89 M
images in total. Tiny-ImageNet is a 200-class natural image dataset
sub-sampled from ImageNet dataset and it contains 100,000 training
and 10,000 validation images.
Models. Table 3 shows the task DNN used by each dataset. For
CIFAR-10, the task DNN model is a ResNet-152 with an accuracy of
95.16%. For GTSRB, the task DNN we use is a ResNet-34 model with
an accuracy of 98.6%. The ResNet-152 for CIFAR-100 has an accu-
racy of 80.11%. The task model for Tiny-ImageNet is WideResNet-
101, and its accuracy is 85.20%. Please note that for Tiny-ImageNet,
we use pre-trained weights on the ImageNet dataset and fine-tune
them to obtain high accuracy. We use Pytorch profiling tool "thop"2
to quantify model GFLOPs and parameters. We quantize all DNN
parameters into 8-bit integers (INT-8) following a uniform affine
quantitizer [18].
FaultModel. In our experiment, we use two types of fault injection:
random fault injection and BitFlip Attack (BFA) [33]. For random
fault injection, in each simulation run, we randomly flip n bits in
the model and pass one randomly selected image to the DNNmodel
for inference. BFA proposed in [33] is the state-of-art fault injection
attack on DNN models. It can crash the DNN system by injecting
a small number of bit-flips by searching the most vulnerable bit
progressively. A failure occurs when the predicted label is different
from the one obtained in the fault-free case.
Risk Impact Martrix. In practice, the risk impact matrix should
be determined by system designers after conducting application-
specific risk analysis. One practical solution would be categorizing
the risk impact into a few risk levels and filing the matrix accord-
ingly. In our experiments. we simulate the impact matrix with two
configurations.
2https://github.com/Lyken17/pytorch-OpCounter
• Uniform Impact, where all entries are ones. It represents
that the risk impact among all classes are equal. When the
risks of different classes do not have significant differences,
the uniform impact matrix can be used for simplicity.
• Non-uniform Impact, where the risk impact values are set
to two different levels. As classes with the low precision are
not trustworthy themselves and hence have low risk, in this
configuration, we assign those classes with the lowest 25%
precision with impact 1 and the others with 100.
Risk Probability Matrix. We obtain the risk probability matrix
and the failure coverage of the checker DNN with random fault
injection experiments. Figure 5 shows the risk probability matrices
of different state-of-art model architectures trained on CIFAR-10.
We perform 4 million fault injections to obtain the result in this
figure3. For visualization purposes, the probability matrix is divided
by the maximum element. The sum of all elements in the original
probability matrix is 1.
We can observe that the risk probability matrix is more task-
related than model-related. The probability distributions are very
similar across different DNN models on the same CIFAR-10 task.
For example, in Figure 5 (a), the value between dog and cat is the
highest one with fault injections. It is also true for Figure 5 (b) and
(c). This matrix will be used in the task simplification process.
6.2 Effectiveness of Architecture Exploration
In this part, we study the effectiveness of the architecture explo-
ration.
Figure 6 shows the consistency, indicated by blue points and
approximated by blue curve, and the computational overhead, indi-
cated by red points and connected by the red curve, of checker DNN
models with different sizes trained by DeepDyve. Please note that
we only investigate five checker model sizes for Tiny-ImageNet due
to high training effort for this dataset, including the pre-training
on ImageNet dataset and fine-tuning on Tiny-Imagenet. For all the
four datasets, the consistency between the task and checker models
improves with the increasing size of checker DNNs. Also, as we can
observe, there is a turning point on the computational overhead
curve. Before the turning point, the re-computation dominates the
3More fault injections are performed, and the results are similar.
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Figure 6: Consistency v.s. overhead in the architecture exploration stage.
Table 4: Task simplification further shrink the overhead.
Dataset Impact Matrix StartConsistency
Before TaskSim. After TaskSim kO(C) Wcov O(C) Wcov
CIFAR-10 non-uniform 91.62% 9.18% 86.94% 6.88% 86.12% 8uniform 9.18% 75.90% 9.11% 75.90% 9
GTSRB non-uniform 98.75% 2.68% 98.46% 1.94% 98.23% 23uniform 2.68% 98.15% 2.56% 98.15% 33
CIFAR-100 non-uniform 75.82% 27.48% 67.29% 24.02% 66.92% 83uniform 27.48% 74.33% 27.42% 74.33% 99
Tiny-ImageNet non-uniform 79.19% 36.91% 76.40% 35.56% 75.19% 186uniform 36.91% 78.03% 36.84% 78.02% 198
computational overhead O(C), and after which, the checker models’
computational cost dominates the O(C).
First, compared to the architecture with the highest consistency
(i.e., duplication), the optimized architecture can greatly reduce the
overhead. For CIFAR-10, GTSRB, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet,
91.82%, 97.32%, 72.52% and 63.09% overhead can be saved with 8.38%,
1.25%, 24.18% and 20.81% consistency degradation, respectively
(see Table 4). We also observe that the consistency values vary for
different datasets. After manual checking, we found the consistency
values of the optimized architecture on the training set are almost
100%, but it generalizes differently during inference for the four
data sets.
Second, the relation between consistencies, architecture sizes,
and the optimal point is well captured by THEOREM 4.1 . For
example, the resulting consistency function for CIFAR-10 is f (α) =
− 0.003α + 0.94, and hence the optimal point is when α = 0.11 (recall
that the optimal point is 3
√
a
x ). This is compatible with the red
curve where α = 0.11 almost renders the minimal computational
overhead. Similarly, the consistency function for GTSRB is f (α) =
− 0.007α + 1.0 and the calculated optimal point is α = 0.15, which is
also compatible with the red curve. Therefore, the initial checker
DNN architecture can be efficiently found by the proposed method.
6.3 Effectiveness of Task Exploration
In this part, we first evaluate the weighted coverageWcov . and
overhead O(C) under various simplified classes k . Then, we study
how the risk impact matrix affects task simplification.
First, we observe that task simplification can significantly reduce
the overhead of DeepDyve with little coverage degradation. In
Figure 7, we use the checker DNN design obtained from Section 6.2
and trace the weighted coverageWcov . and overhead O(C) during
the agglomerative class clustering process. Table 4 shows the final
task simplification results. Through task simplification, we can save
the overhead by (9.18% − 6.88%)/9.18% = 25.05%, 27.61%, 12.60%,
3.38% for CIFAR-10, GTSRB, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet, at the
cost of 0.9%, 0.2%, 0.5%, 1.6% coverage degradation, respectively.
We can also observe that fault coverage and overhead vary a
lot under different impact matrix configurations. First, the initial
weighted coverage values before task simplification is different
for uniform and non-uniform settings, because the Ii j term in the
definition of weighed coverage given by Equation 4 varies. Sec-
ond, we observe much more overhead savings can be achieved in
the non-uniform case. For example, the overhead saving can be
improved from 0.76% to 25.05% on CIFAR-10 when changing to
non-uniform impact matrix. This is because, the impact of classes
with low precision is set as lower values under such circumstances,
which provides more opportunities for task simplification. In other
words, a reasonable impact matrix is beneficial for protection with
DeepDyve and hence is highly recommended.
6.4 DeepDyve vs. Threshold Checking
In this section, we compare the performance of DeepDyve with
the Threshold Checking scheme proposed in [23]. We experiment
under both random fault attack and BitFlip Attack (BFA) settings.
We show the results in Table 5, including the false-positive rate
(FPR), false-negative rate (FNR), computational overhead (O(C)),
and the weighted coverage (Wcov.).
First, we observe DeepDyve significantly outperforms Threshold
Checking in terms of Wcov., which in turn leads to smaller FNR. As
discussed in Section 2, most intermediate activation values locate
in the normal range even under fault attack, especially for the
quantized DNN case. Hence, most faults are missed with Threshold
Checking, but they can be detected by DeepDyve.
Second, in most cases, we can observe both DeepDyve and
Threshold Checking performs better under BFA compared to ran-
dom fault attacks. We manually check the internal values of DNN
under fault attack and find that the magnitude of value change is
larger in BFA than in random fault attacks, thereby making fault
detection easier.
Third, the FPR of Threshold Checking is above zero while that
of our DeepDyve system is zero. For example, the FPR of Threshold
Checking for CIFAR-10 dataset is 0.04%. As discussed in Section 2,
threshold Detection sets the thresholds as 1.1 times the maximum
number of classes (k)
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Figure 7: Tracing of the fault coverage and overhead change in task simplification process.
Table 5: Comparison between DeepDyve and threshold checking.
Dataset Impact Matrix
Random Fault Attack BFA
Threshold Checking DeepDyve Threshold Checking DeepDyve
FPR FNR O(C) Wcov. FPR FNR O(C) Wcov. FPR FNR O(C) Wcov. FPR FNR O(C) Wcov.
CIFAR-10 non-uniform 0.04% 96.24% - 4.10% 0.00% 43.29% 6.88% 82.98% 0.04% 33.45% - 66.39% 0.00% 1.01% 6.88% 98.93%uniform 0.04% 90.87% - 9.12% 0.00% 4.06% 9.11% 75.94% 0.04% 55.52% - 44.48% 0.00% 2.15% 9.11% 97.85%
GTSRB non-uniform 0.00% 99.72% - 0.3% 0.00% 16.53% 1.94% 95.49% 0.00% 100.00% - 0.00% 0.00% 0.90% 1.94% 99.75%uniform 0.00% 96.85% - 3.15% 0.00% 5.07% 2.56% 94.93% 0.00% 99.88% - 0.12% 0.00% 0.79% 2.56% 99.21%
CIFAR-100 non-uniform 0.02% 65.11% - 33.48% 0.00% 31.51% 24.02% 74.67% 0.02% 14.50% - 86.61% 0.00% 1.84% 24.02% 99.50%uniform 0.02% 86.99% - 13.01% 0.00% 19.21% 27.42% 80.79% 0.02% 1.05% - 98.95% 0.00% 0.37% 27.42% 99.63%
Tiny-ImageNet non-uniform 0.02% 69.31% - 30.56% 0.00% 19.46% 35.19% 82.00% 0.02% 0.00% - 100.00% 0.00% 0.05% 35.19% 99.94%uniform 0.06% 87.34% - 12.65% 0.00% 20.68% 36.84% 82.98% 0.06% 0.08% - 99.92% 0.00% 0.02% 36.84% 99.98%
and a minimum of each layer’s normal activation values on the
training set. On the testing set, there are few exceptions where the
activation values are beyond this range. In contrast, in the normal
execution of DeepDyve, the comparator’s false positives, which are
caused by inconsistencies between task and checker models, are
subject to re-computation, and hence, the system’s false positives
are guaranteed to be zero.
6.5 Impact of Model Accuracy
Previous experiments suggest that the overhead of DeepDyve for
CIFAR-100 and Tiny-ImageNet dataset are quite high, even after
task simplification. This is because the per-class accuracy of the
task model on these two datasets varies and some of them are very
low, as shown in Figure 8. In safety-critical applications, a class is
deserved to be protected only when its accuracy is high enough.
Considering the above, we conduct a case study on CIFAR-100 and
let the impact of 75% of the classes with the lowest precision to be
zero.
Previously, the computational overhead induced by the checker
DNN before task simplification was 27.48% (See Table 4). With the
above setting, as we only care classes with non-zero impact, we
let the comparator only check the inconsistencies of these classes.
Given this, the overhead induced by the checker DNN before task
simplification is 16.17%. Task simplification can further reduce the
overhead from 16.17% to 9.88% without loss of weighted coverage
(38.89% overhead savings). Also, the simplified model can reach
90.66% weighted coverage under random fault attack and 99.78%
weighted coverage under BFA attack.
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Figure 8: Per-class accuracy for CIFAR-100.
7 DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the proposed DeepDyve
architecture and its limitations.
7.1 Robustness of DeepDyve
What if the checker DNN has faults? If the checker DNN is
faulty while the task DNN is correct, the final inference accuracy
would remain the same, because the systemwould accept the output
from the task model anyway. There could be extra latency. To
mitigate this issue, we could leverage various hardening techniques
(e.g., secure enclaves) to protect it at a reasonable cost since the
checker DNN is much smaller than the task DNN model.
Attack on DeepDyve. Attackers need to create consistent faulty
outputs to bypass the comparison logic of DeepDyve to successful
launch their attacks.
One way to achieve this is to inject faults into the task and
checker models simultaneously. However, the cost of launching
such an attack in practice is very high, if not impossible. On the
one hand, simultaneously injecting faults at two specific positions
is difficult. For example, row-hammer attack relies on the weakness
of physical memory row, and it cannot be fully controlled. On
the other hand, if low-precision fault injection technique is used to
inject random faults into the two DNNs, the probability distribution
of the faulty output of a DNN is given by its risk probability matrix,
and the probability of two DNNs’ outputs happens to be the same
is given by
Pcoll ision =
N∑
i
pi ∗ qi , (17)
where pi and qi are the probabilities of task DNN and checker DNN
generating the same output i , respectively, and N is the number of
classes. Obviously, this value decreases with the increase of classes.
The Pcoll ision values are 8.9%, 2.77%, 0.87%, and 0.49% for CIFAR-10,
GTSRB, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively. Given that
the probability of DNNs generating wrong outputs under random
faults Perror is extremely low. The possibility for such attack to
succeed is negligible.
Another way to successfully launch fault injection attacks is
to target those inconsistent cases and make them consistent with
faulty result. To achieve this objective, however, attackers need to
be able to tell whether an incoming data is consistent at runtime
and perform fault injection before its inference is finished. This is
a daunting objective to achieve, especially considering the usual
long preparation time for fault injection.
7.2 Limitations and Future Work
DeepDyve brings latency and reduces throughput due to recompu-
tation, which needs to be considered when performing real-time
tasks. For example, there is about 1% of throughput loss for the
above DeepDyve model constructed on the GTSRB dataset. This
overhead can be reduced when the consistency rate between the
checker DNN and the task DNN models increases.
Also, our current evaluation is only on the 8-bit integer (INT-8)
data representation. One reason is that INT-8 is a popular data
type and supported by well known deep learning frameworks and
tool-chains, such as Pytorh 4, Tensorflow5, NVIDIA®TensorRD 6,
and Xilinx®DNNDK 7. Popular hardware platforms like TPU [15]
support integer operations as well. The second reason is that the
Pytorch 1.3 (the one we use) and the code from BFA attack 8 only
supports INT-8 quantization in its current version. We shall extend
our work to study the impact of different data types in the future.
8 RELATEDWORKS
DNNs have become an enabling technology for many safety-critical
applications, and hence there is a growing research interest for
fault-tolerant DNN designs.
4https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/quantization.html
5https://www.tensorflow.org/lite/performance/post_training_quantization
6https://developer.nvidia.com/tensorrt
7https://www.xilinx.com/products/design-tools/ai-inference/edge-ai-
platform.html#dnndk
8https://github.com/elliothe/BFA
In the literature, someworks focused on improving fault-tolerance
of DNN systems built with unreliable resistive random-access mem-
ory (RRAM) [3, 25, 41], an emerging device with huge energy ef-
ficiency benefits. However, this technology is still in its infancy
and is not applicable for safety-critical AI applications. Existing
fault-tolerant solutions for DNN systems built with conventional
CMOS devices can be categorized as passive solutions or active
solutions.
Passive fault-tolerant solutions reduce the probability of failure
occurrences for a certain level at the design stage, including fault-
mitigation techniques for the DNN design itself and fault-masking
solutions with redundant circuitries. To be specific, fault-mitigation
techniques include: (i) Resilient training [7, 16, 43, 46], which explic-
itly considers hardware faults during the DNN training phase; (ii)
Resilient architecture design [5, 6, 8, 37], which tries to find an error-
resilient network architecture or inserts redundancies for those
critical elements in the system; (iii) Device hardening [2, 23], which
tries to protect some critical storage elements in the system by
selectively hardening them. The above solutions require significant
design effort, and they usually cannot provide sufficient fault cov-
erage. Fault-masking techniques are conceptually simple. We could
use error-correcting codes (ECC) to protect memory elements [35]
and triple-modular redundancy (TMR) to protect computational
units [29, 42]. However, the corresponding hardware overhead is
exceptionally high.
Active fault-tolerant solutions detect and recover from faults
by re-organizing the system in real-time. To achieve active fault-
tolerance, we need to be able to detect faults online. There are a
few solutions in this direction [23, 24, 38]. Among these techniques,
[23, 38] has small hardware overhead, but their fault detection
capabilities are limited, especially for quantized DNNs; the fault
coverage of the replication-based solution in [24] is comparable to
DeepDyve, but its overhead is much higher.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed DeepDyve, a novel dynamic verifica-
tion technique against fault injection attacks on DNN systems. By
introducing a far simpler and smaller checker DNN into the sys-
tem, DeepDyve significantly outperforms state-of-the-art solutions,
reducing 90% risks at around 10% computational overhead.
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